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Abstract
Cirquent calculus is a new proof-theoretic and semantic approach introduced by G.Japaridze
for the needs of his theory of computability logic. The earlier article “From formulas to cirquents
in computability logic” by Japaridze generalized the concept of cirquents to the version with what
are termed clusterng and ranking, and showed that, through cirquents with clustering and ranking,
one can capture, refine and generalize the so called extended IF logic. Japaridze’s treatment of
extended IF logic, however, was purely semantical, and no deductive system was proposed. The
present paper syntactically constructs a cirquent calculus system with clustering and ranking, sound
and complete w.r.t. the propositional fragment of cirquent-based semantics. Such a system can be
considered not only a conservative extension of classical propositional logic but also, when limited
to cirquents with ≤ 2 ranks, an axiomatization of purely propositional extended IF logic in its full
generality.
MSC: primary: 03B47; secondary: 03B70; 68Q10; 68T27; 68T15.
Keywords: Computability logic; Cirquent calculus; IF logic.
1 Introduction
Cirquent calculus is a new proof-theoretic and semantic approach introduced by G.Japaridze [4] for
the needs of his theory of computability logic [3, 6]. Its main characteristic feature is being based on
circuit-style structures called cirquents, as opposed to the more traditional approaches that manipulate
tree-like objects such as formulas. Cirquents, unlike formulas, are allowing (one or another sort of)
sharing of subcomponents between different components. Due to sharing, cirquent calculus has greater
expressiveness and higher efficiency. For instance, as shown in [5], the analytic cirquent calculus system
CL8 achieves an exponential speedup of proofs over the classical analytic systems. Since its birth,
cirquent calculus has been developed in a series of articles [5, 7–9, 14–17].
The concept of cirquents was qualitatively generalized in [7], where the ideas of clustering and ranking
were introduced. Intuitively, clusters are generalized disjunctive or conjunctive gates, i.e. switch-style
devices that combine tuples of individual gates of a given type in a parallel way — in a way where the
choice (left or right) of an argument is shared between all members. Ranks are superior consoles of
a certain subset of clusters, with all such consoles arranged in a linear order indicating in what order
selections by the consoles should be made.
It was showed semantically in [7] that, through cirquents with clustering both disjunctions and con-
junctions and ranking, one can capture, refine and generalize the conservative extension of independence-
friendly (IF) logic [2, 10] known as extended IF logic (cf. [13]). The latter, in addition to what IF logic
calls strong negation ∼, also considers weak negation ¬. The main distinguishing feature of (extended)
∗Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (61303030) and the Fundamental Research Funds for
the Central Universities of China (K5051370023).
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IF logic is allowing one to express independence relations between quantifiers. But the past attempts
(cf. [11, 12]) to develop (extended) IF logic at the purely propositional level have remained limited
to some special syntactic fragments of the language. Then the approach in [7] allows one to account
for independence from propositional connectives in the same spirit as (extended) IF logic accounts for
independence from quantifiers.
Japaridze’s treatment of extended IF logic in [7], however, was purely semantical, and no deductive
system was proposed. In this paper, we axiomatically construct a cirquent calculus system, called RIFp,
with clustered disjunctive and conjunctive connectives and n ranks for any positive integer n. Such a
system is proved to be sound and complete w.r.t. the propositional fragment of Japaridze’s cirquent-
based semantics, and can be considered not only a conservative extension of classical propositional logic
but also, when limited to cirquents with ≤ 2 ranks, an axiomatization of purely propositional extended
IF logic in its full generality.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we reproduce the basic concepts from [7] on which the later parts of the paper will rely.
An interested reader may consult [7] for additional explanations, illustrations and examples.
Our propositional language has infinitely many atoms, for which p, q, r, s, . . . will be used as
metavariables. An atom p and its negation ¬p are called literals. A formula means one of the
language of classical propositional logic, built from literals and the binary connectives ∧,∨ in the stan-
dard way. A → B is understood as an abbreviation of ¬A ∨ B. And ¬, when applied to anything
other than an atom, is understood as an abbreviation defined by ¬¬A = A, ¬(A ∧B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B and
¬(A ∨B) = ¬A ∧ ¬B. Namely, all formulas are required to be in negation normal form.
A cirquent is a formula together with two extra parameters called clustering and ranking, re-
spectively. Clustering is a partition of the set of all occurrences of ∨,∧ into subsets, called clusters,
satisfying the condition that all occurrences of ∨,∧ within any given cluster have the same type. Rank-
ing is a partition of the set of all ∨ and ∧ clusters into subsets, called ranks, arranged in a linear
order, with each rank satisfying the condition that all clusters in it have the same type.1 Each cluster
is associated with a unique positive integer called its ID. IDs serve as identifiers for clusters, and we
will simply say “cluster k” to mean “the cluster whose ID is k”. A rank containing ∧-clusters is said to
be conjunctive, and a rank containing ∨-clusters disjunctive. Since the ranks are linearly ordered,
we will refer to them as the 1st rank, the 2nd rank, etc. or rank 1, rank 2, etc. Also, instead of “cluster
k is in the ith rank”, we will say “k is of rank i”.
One way to represent cirquents is to do so graphically, using arcs to indicate the occurrences of the
connectives’ “clusteral affiliations” and the clusters’ “rankal affiliations” as in the following figure:
(
(¬s ∨ s) ∧ (¬r ∨ r)
)
∨
(
(¬p ∨ s) ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)
)✧✧
❛
❛
❛
cluster 1
✭✭✭✭✭✭✭
P
P
P
cluster 4
✟
✟
❍
❍
cluster 3cluster 2
❛
❛❛
rank 1 rank 2 rank 3
✟
✟
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
For space efficiency considerations, in this paper we will instead be writing cirquents just like formulas,
only with every occurrence of ∨ (resp. ∧) indexed with a symbol ki, called the index of this occurrence,
as an indication that this occurrence belongs to cluster k, and that such a cluster k is of rank i. So,
for instance, the above cirquent will be simply written as
(
(¬s∨11 s)∧42 (¬r ∨11 r)
)
∨21
(
(¬p∨33 s)∧42
(r ∨33 ¬r)
)
.
A cirquent C is said to be classical iff all of its clusters are singletons. We shall identify such a
cirquent with the formula of classical logic obtained from it by simply deleting all indices, i.e. replacing
1The concept of cirquents considered in cirquent calculus is more general than the one defined here. See [7].
2
each ∨ki (resp. ∧ki)(whatever k and i) with just ∨ (resp. ∧). Throughout the rest of this paper, we
will be using the term oconnective to refer to a connective together with a particular occurrence of it
in a cirquent.
An interpretation (or model) is a function ∗ that sends each atom p to one of the values p∗ ∈
{⊤,⊥}, and extends to all literals by stipulating that (¬p)∗ = ⊤ iff p∗ = ⊥.
Let i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}. An i-metaselection is a function fi : {1, 2, 3, . . .} → {left,right}. Let C be a
cirquent with n ranks. A metaselection for C is an n-tuple
−→
f = (f1, . . . , fn) where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
fi is an i-metaselection.
Given a cirquent C with n ranks and a metaselection
−→
f = (f1, . . . , fn) for C, the resolvent of a
disjunctive (resp. conjunctive) subcirquent A∨ki B (resp. A∧ki B) of C is defined to be A if fi(k) = left,
and B if fi(k) = right.
Let C be a cirquent with n ranks, ∗ an interpretation, and
−→
f = (f1, . . . , fn) a metaselection for C.
In this context, with “metatrue” to be read as “metatrue w.r.t. (∗,
−→
f )”, we say that:
• A literal L of C is metatrue iff L∗ = ⊤.
• A subcirquent A ∨ki B (resp. A ∧ki B) of C is metatrue iff so is its resolvent.
Next, we say that C is true under the interpretation ∗ (in the model ∗), or simply that C∗ is true, iff
Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such that C is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗, (f1, . . . , fn)).
Here each Qifi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) abbreviates the phrase “for every i-metaselection fi” if the ith rank of C is
conjunctive, and “there is an i-metaselection fi” if the ith rank of C is disjunctive. Finally, we say that
C is valid iff it is true under every interpretation (in every model).
Note that, when C is a formula, i.e. a cirquent where all clusters are singletons, C is valid iff it is valid
(tautological) in the sense of classical logic. And classical truth of a formula under an interpretation ∗
means nothing but Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such that the formula is metatrue in our sense w.r.t. (
∗, (f1, . . . , fn)).
So, classical logic is nothing but the conservative fragment of our logic obtained by only allowing
formulas in the language.
The rest of this section is not technically relevant to the main results of the present paper and is
only meant to understand what all of the above has to do with extended IF logic.2 Consider the formula
∀x(∃y/∀x) p(x, y) (1)
with its standard meaning. According to the latter, given any object x, the object y can be chosen
so that p(x, y) is true, with the modifier ‘∀x’ attached to ‘∃y’ indicating that here y can be chosen
independently from (without any knowledge of) x. Assuming that the universe of discourse is {1, 2},
(1) can just as well be (re-)written as
(
p(1, 1) ∨y/∧x p(1, 2)
)
∧x
(
p(2, 1) ∨y/∧x p(2, 2)
)
, (2)
which, after further rewriting p(1, 1), p(1, 2), p(2, 1), p(2, 2) as the more compact p, q, r, s, is the propo-
sitional formula
(p ∨y/∧x q) ∧x (r ∨y/∧x s). (3)
Here we have turned ∀x into ∧x, ∃y into ∨y , with the superscript in each case used just to remind us from
which quantifier each oconnective was obtained, and ∨y/∧x indicating that the y-superscripted disjunc-
tion is independent of the x-superscripted conjunction. Now, Japaridze’s recipes (see [7], Descriptions
7.4, 7.5 and 7.6) translate (3) into the following cirquent:
(p ∨11 q) ∧22 (r ∨11 s). (4)
2For those unfamiliar with (extended) IF logic, they may want to consult [10] for the basic IF logic or [13] for the
extended one.
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Note that cluster 1 contains two disjunctive oconnectives — namely, those originating from ∃y, cluster
2 is a conjunctive singleton, all disjunctive clusters are of rank 1, and all conjunctive clusters are of
rank 2. It is left as an exercise for the reader to convince himself or herself that, in any given model
(interpretation) ∗, (4) is true in our sense if and only if (3) is true in the sense of extended IF logic.
Similarly, the two forms of (1)’s negation ¬∀x(∃y/∀x) p(x, y) and ∼ ∀x(∃y/∀x) p(x, y) are translated
into the cirquents (¬p ∧11 ¬q) ∨22 (¬r ∧11 ¬s) and (¬p ∧12 ¬q) ∨21 (¬r ∧12 ¬s), respectively. Since the
above translations only generate cirquents with ≤ 2 ranks, these sorts of cirquents are sufficient for
capturing extended IF logic.
Well, the present case is a “lucky” case because we easily understand what “true in the sense of
extended IF logic” means for (3) — after all, (3) originates from (and will be handled in the same way
as) the first-order (1). As an example of an “unlucky” case, consider the cirquent
(r ∨11 s) ∧22
(
(p ∨11 q) ∧32 q
)
. (5)
It is just as meaningful from the point of view of our semantics as any other cirquent, including (4). An
attempt to express the same in the traditional formalism of IF logic apparently yields something like
(r ∨/∧x s) ∧x
(
(p ∨/∧x q) ∧y q
)
. (6)
Unlike (3), however, (6) is problematic for the traditional semantical approaches (the ones based on
imperfect information games) to IF logic. Namely, because of a problem called signaling, it is far from
clear how its truth should be understood.
If the connections and differences between our present semantics and that of extended IF logic are
still not clear, see the first 7 sections of [7] for more explanations, discussions and examples.
3 Main results
3.1 System RIFp introduced
Our system introduced in this paper is called RIFp (ranked IF logic at the propositional level). As will
be seen shortly, the inference rules of RIFp modify cirquents at any level rather than only around the
root. Thus, RIFp is in fact a deep inference system, in the style of [1]. This explains our borrowing
some notation from the Calculus of Structures. Namely, we will be using Φ{} or Ψ{} to denote any
cirquent where a vacancy (“hole”) {} appears in the place of a subcirquent. The vacancy {} can be filled
with any cirquent. For example, if Φ{} = (p∨12 q)∨12 ({}∧21 q), then Φ{¬p} = (p∨12 q)∨12 (¬p∧21 q),
Φ{q} = (p ∨12 q) ∨12 (q ∧21 q), and Φ{p ∨12 q} = (p ∨12 q) ∨12 ((p ∨12 q) ∧21 q).
Further, we will be using C[ki] to denote a cirquent C that contains some occurrence of ki in its
representation, where ki is the index of some oconnective of C. And we will be using C[ki/li] to denote
the resulting cirquent from C[ki] by replacing all the occurrences of ki in C[ki] by li.
Below comes the inference rules of RIFp, where A,B, C,D stand for any cirquents; ⊙ and ◦ are
variables over {∧,∨}.3 It is important to point out that, in each rule, all occurrences of ⊙ (resp. ◦)
stand for the same object.
Rule I: This rule has two versions, Rule I (left) and Rule I (right), as shown in the following figure,
where ki are indices of oconnectives ⊙.
Φ
{
Ψ{A} ⊙ki C
}
Rule I (left)
Φ
{
Ψ{A⊙ki B} ⊙ki C
}
Φ
{
C ⊙ki Ψ{A}
}
Rule I (right)
Φ
{
C ⊙ki Ψ{B ⊙ki A}
}
3In the remaining of this paper, without any further indication, ⊙ (resp. ◦) will always stand for a variable over {∧,∨}.
4
Rule II: This rule also has two versions, Rule II (left) and Rule II (right), as shown in the following
figure, where (i) ki, lj,mj , nj are indices of oconnectives satisfying the condition that when cluster l is
a non-singleton in the conclusion, m = n = l; when cluster l is a singleton in the conclusion, m,n are
any positive integers such that clusters m,n are sigletons in the premise; (ii) i ≤ j; (iii) all the ranks t
that occurs in C (in the conclusion) satisfy the condition that t ≥ i; (iv) C1 (resp. C2) is the resulting
cirquent from C by replacing in C each singleton cluster s of (whatever) rank r with singleton cluster
s1 (resp. s2) of the same rank r in the premise.
Φ
{
(A ◦mj C1)⊙ki (B ◦nj C2)
}
Rule II (left)
Φ
{
(A⊙ki B) ◦lj C
}
Φ
{
(C1 ◦mj A)⊙ki (C2 ◦nj B)
}
Rule II (right)
Φ
{
C ◦lj (A⊙ki B)
}
Rule III: This rule is shown in the following figure, where (i) ki, lj ,mj, nj are indices of oconnectives
satisfying the condition that when cluster l is a non-singleton in the conclusion, m = n = l; when cluster
l is a singleton in the conclusion, m,n are any positive integers such that clusters m,n are sigletons in
the premise; (ii) i ≤ j.
Φ
{
(A ◦mj C)⊙ki (B ◦nj D)
}
Rule III
Φ
{
(A⊙ki B) ◦lj (C ⊙ki D)
}
Rule IV: This rule is shown in the following figure, where (i) ki, lj , rj are indices of oconnectives
satisfying the conditions that l only occurs in the subcirquents A and B in the conclusion, and that r
(in the premise) is any positive integer such that r does not occur in the conclusion; (ii) i < j.
Φ
{
A[lj ]⊙ki B[l
j/rj ]
}
Rule IV
Φ
{
A[lj ]⊙ki B[l
j]
}
It is obvious that all rules of RIFp preserve the liner order of ranks of cirquents in both top-down
and bottom-up directions. In each application of these rules, we call the oconnective(s) ⊙ki in the
premise (resp. conclusion), as shown in the above corresponding figures, the key oconnecitve(s) of
this application in the premise (resp. conclusion).
The axioms of RIFp are all classical cirquents that (seen as formulas) are tautologies of classical
propositional logic.
A proof of a cirquent C in RIFp is a sequence of cirquents such that the first cirquent in the
sequence is an axiom of RIFp, the last cirquent is C, and every cirquent, except the axiom, follows from
the preceding cirquent by one of the rules of RIFp. When such a proof exists, C is said to be provable
in RIFp.
Lemma 3.1 Given a cirquent Φ{A⊙kiB}, a metaselection
−→
f = (f1, . . . , fn) for it and an interpretation
∗, the cirquent Φ{A⊙kiB} is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,
−→
f ) iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and the cirquent
Φ{A} (resp. Φ{B}) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗,
−→
f ).
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of oconnectives of Φ{}.
For the basis, assume that the number of oconnectives of Φ{} is 0. Then Φ{A ⊙ki B} = A ⊙ki B,
Φ{A} = A and Φ{B} = B. By the definition of metatruth, we immediately have A ⊙ki B is metatrue
w.r.t. (∗,
−→
f ) if and only if fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and its resolvent A (resp. B) is so.
Now (induction hypothesis) assume that the proposition holds when the number of oconnectives of
Φ{} is n. We want to show that the proposition still holds when the number of oconnectives of Φ{} is
n+ 1. Two cases (i), (ii) are to be considered here:
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(i) Assume that the main connective of Φ{} is ◦ ∈ {∧,∨} whose index is lj such that cluster l is a
singleton. Namely, assume Φ{A ⊙ki B} = Ψ{A ⊙ki B} ◦lj C for some cirquent C (the other possibility
Φ{A⊙ki B} = C ◦lj Ψ{A⊙ki B} is similar). The following two (sub)cases need to be further considered.
Case (a): fj(l) = right. Then Ψ{A ⊙ki B} ◦lj C is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,
−→
f ) iff its resolvent C is so.
But exactly the same holds for both Ψ{A} ◦lj C and Ψ{B}◦lj C (for the same reason). Thus, vacuously
adding “fi(k) = . . .”, we arrive at the desired conclusion that Ψ{A⊙ki B}◦lj C is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,
−→
f )
iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and Ψ{A} ◦lj C (resp. Ψ{B} ◦lj C) is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,
−→
f ).
Case (b): fj(l) = left. Then Ψ{A⊙ki B} ◦lj C is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,
−→
f ) iff its resolvent Ψ{A⊙ki B}
is so, which, in turn (by the induction hypothesis), is the case iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right)
and Ψ{A} (resp. Ψ{B}) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗,
−→
f ). This, in turn, is the case iff fi(k) = left (resp.
fi(k) = right) and Φ{A} (resp. Φ{B}) is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,
−→
f ). Hence the desired conclusion holds.
(ii) Assume that the main connective of Φ{} is ◦ ∈ {∧,∨} whose index is mj such that cluster m
is a non-singleton. Namely, assume Φ{A ⊙ki B} = Ψ{A ⊙ki B} ◦mj C for some cirquent C (the other
possibility Φ{A ⊙ki B} = C ◦mj Ψ{A ⊙ki B} is similar). If m 6= k, then we can employ an essentially
the same argument as the one used in (i). And if m = k (so that i = j), then the case is even simpler,
so we leave details to the reader.
Lemma 3.2 All rules of RIFp preserve truth in both top-down and bottom-up directions.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary interpretation ∗.
Rule I: Here we only consider Rule I (left), with Rule I (right) being similar. We want to show that
the premise Φ
{
Ψ{A} ⊙ki C
}
is true under ∗ iff so is the conclusion Φ
{
Ψ{A⊙ki B} ⊙ki C
}
.
(i) Suppose that the conclusion Φ
{
Ψ{A ⊙ki B} ⊙ki C
}
is true under ∗. Let 1, . . . , n be the linear
order of all ranks of the conclusion, and n1, . . . , nm (m ≤ n) that of the premise. Obviously, n1, . . . , nm
is a subsequence of 1, . . . , n.
For any j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), let Onjgnj abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every nj-metaselection gnj” if
the njth rank of the premise is conjunctive, and the phrase (2) “let gnj be the nj-metaselection fnj
which is the one in phrase (4)” if the njth rank of the premise is disjunctive. Let Pnjfnj abbreviate the
phrase (3) “ for the nj-metaselection fnj = gnj where gnj comes from phrase (1)” if the njth rank of the
conclusion is conjunctive, and the phrase (4) “there is a nj-metaselection fnj” if the njth rank of the
conclusion is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the conclusion), we have that Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such that the
conclusion Φ
{
Ψ{A⊙ki B}⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)), where, for any r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Qrfr
satisfies the conditions that: (a) when r = nj for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Qrfr = Prfr; (b) otherwise Qrfr
abbreviates the phrase “for every r-metaselection fr” if the rth rank of the conclusion is conjunctive,
and “there is a r-metaselection fr” if the rth rank of the conclusion is disjunctive.
By lemma 3.1 (applied twice), Φ
{
Ψ{A⊙kiB}⊙kiC
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)) iff fi(k) = left
(resp. fi(k) = right) and Φ
{
Ψ{A}
}
(resp. Φ{C}) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). This, in
turn, is the case iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and Φ
{
Ψ{A}
}
(resp. Φ{C}) is metatrue
w.r.t. (∗, (gn1 , . . . , gnm)), which, in turn, is the case iff the premise Φ
{
Ψ{A} ⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t.
(∗, (gn1 , . . . , gnm)). Finally, we have On1gn1 . . .Onmgnm such that the premise Φ
{
Ψ{A}⊙ki C
}
is meta-
true w.r.t. (∗, (gn1 , . . . , gnm)), which means the premise is true under
∗.
(ii) Now suppose that the premise Φ
{
Ψ{A}⊙ki C
}
is true under ∗. Let 1, . . . ,m be the linear order
of all ranks of the premise, and 1, . . . , n (n ≥ m) that of the conclusion.
For any j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), let Pjfj abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every j-metaselection fj” if the jth
rank of the conclusion is conjunctive, and the phrase (2) “let fj be the j-metaselection gj which is the
one in phrase (4)” if the jth rank of the conclusion is disjunctive. Let Ojgj abbreviate the phrase (3) “for
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the j-metaselection gj = fj where fj comes from phrase (1)” if the jth rank of the premise is conjunctive,
and the phrase (4) “there is a j-metaselection gj” if the jth rank of the premise is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the premise), we have that O1g1 . . .Omgm such that the premise
Φ
{
Ψ{A} ⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gm)). By lemma 3.1, Φ
{
Ψ{A} ⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t.
(∗, (g1, . . . , gm)) iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and Φ
{
Ψ{A}
}
(resp. Φ{C}) is metatrue w.r.t.
(∗, (g1, . . . , gm)). This, in turn, is the case iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and Φ
{
Ψ{A}
}
(resp.
Φ{C}) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fm)). But the ranks m+1, . . . , n only occurs in the subcirquent B
of the conclusion. So, Φ
{
Ψ{A}
}
(resp. Φ{C}) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fm)) iff Φ
{
Ψ{A}
}
(resp.
Φ{C}) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fm, fm+1, . . . , fn)) for any sequence of metaselections fm+1, . . . , fn.
Finally, by lemma 3.1 (applied twice), we get that the premise Φ
{
Ψ{A} ⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t.
(∗, (g1, . . . , gm)) iff the conclusion Φ
{
Ψ{A⊙ki B} ⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)).
Let Qrfr (1 ≤ r ≤ n) be the abbreviation satisfying the conditions that: (a) when 1 ≤ r ≤ m,
Qrfr = Prfr; (b) when m+ 1 ≤ r ≤ n, Qrfr abbreviates the phrase “for every r-metaselection fr” if
the rth rank of the conclusion is conjunctive, and “Let fr be any r-metaselection” if the rth rank of the
conclusion is disjunctive. Then we have Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such that the conclusion Φ
{
Ψ{A⊙ki B}⊙ki C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Hence, the conclusion is true under
∗.
Rule II: Again, we only consider Rule II (left), with Rule II (right) being similar. We want to show
that the premise Φ
{
(A◦mj C1)⊙ki (B ◦nj C2)
}
is true under ∗ iff so is the conclusion Φ
{
(A⊙ki B)◦lj C
}
,
where conditions (i)–(iv) are satisfied as described in the preceding introduction of this rule.
Obviously, the premise and the conclusion have the same (number of) ranks. Suppose that both of
them have n ranks 1, . . . , n. When i < j, there are four situations of the values of ⊙ and ◦, i.e. ⊙ and
◦ are either ∧ and ∨, or ∨ and ∧, or ∧ and ∧, or ∨ and ∨, respectively. When i = j, ⊙ and ◦ should
be the same type, in which case the proposition can be similarly proven as the last two situations when
i < j. Here we only consider one situation that ⊙ and ◦ are ∧ and ∨, respectively, when i < j, with
the other situations being similar. Two (sub)cases need to be further considered.
Case (a): cluster l is a singleton in the conclusion (which means clusters m,n are singletons in the
premise). Let {l1, . . . , ln} be the collection of all singleton clusters in the subcirquent C of the conclusion.
And let {l′1, . . . , l
′
n} (resp. {l
′′
1 , . . . , l
′′
n}) be the collection of all singleton clusters in the subcirquent C1
(resp. C2) in the premise satisfying the condition that, for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l
′
h (resp. l
′′
h) occurs in C1
(resp. C2) at the same place as lh occurs in the C part of the conclusion.
Suppose that the premise Φ
{
(A ∨mj C1) ∧ki (B ∨nj C2)
}
is true under ∗. For any r ∈ {1, . . . , n},
let Qrfr abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every r-metaselection fr” if the rth rank of the conclusion is
conjunctive, and the phrase (2) “let fr be a r-metaselection satisfying the condition that fr(l) = gr(m)
and fr(lh) = gr(l
′
h) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n} when gi(k) = left, fr(l) = gr(n) and fr(lh) = gr(l
′′
h) for
any h ∈ {1, . . . , n} when gi(k) = right, and fr agrees with gr on all other clusters, where gr is the
r-metaselection in phrase (5)” if the rth rank of the conclusion is disjunctive and r ≥ i . And let
Qrfr abbreviate the phrase (3) “let fr be the r-metaselection gr, where gr is the one in phrase (5)”
if the rth rank of the conclusion is disjunctive and r < i. Let Prgr abbreviate the phrase (4) “for
the r-metaselection gr satisfying the condition that gr(l
′
h) = gr(l
′′
h) = fr(lh) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and gr agrees with fr on all other clusters, where fr comes from phrase (1)” if the rth rank of the
premise is conjunctive, and the phrase (5) “there is a r-metaselection gr” if the rth rank of the premise
is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the premise), we have P1g1 . . .Pngn such that the premise
Φ
{
(A ∨mj C1) ∧ki (B ∨nj C2)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). But by lemma 3.1, the premise
Φ
{
(A ∨mj C1) ∧ki (B ∨nj C2)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)) iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right)
and Φ{A ∨mj C1} (resp. Φ{B ∨nj C2}) is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). This, in turn, is the case iff
fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and Φ{A∨lj C} (resp. Φ{B ∨lj C}) is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗, (f1, . . . , fn)).
4
4Note that all the ranks t that occurs in the subcirquent C (resp. C1 or C2) of the conclusion (resp. the premise) satisfy
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The above, in turn, is the case iff the conclusion Φ
{
(A∧ki B)∨lj C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)).
Finally, we have Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such that the conclusion is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Hence, the
conclusion is true under ∗.
Now suppose that the conclusion Φ
{
(A∧ki B)∨lj C
}
is true under ∗. For any r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Qrgr
abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every r-metaselection gr” if the rth rank of the premise is conjunctive,
and the phrase (2) “let gr be a r-metaselection satisfying the condition that gr(m) = gr(n) = fr(l),
gr(l
′
h) = gr(l
′′
h) = fr(lh) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and gr agrees with fr on all other clusters, where fr
is the r-metaselection in phrase (5)” if the rth rank of the premise is disjunctive. Let Prfr abbreviate
the phrase (3) “for the r-metaselection fr = gr, where gr comes from phrase (1)” if the rth rank of the
conclusion is conjunctive and r < i, and the phrase (4) “for the r-metaselection fr satisfying the condition
that fr(lh) = gr(l
′
h) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n} when gi(k) = left, fr(lh) = gr(l
′′
h) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n}
when gi(k) = right, and fr agrees with gr on all other clusters, where gr comes from phrase (1)” if the
rth rank of the conclusion is conjunctive and r ≥ i. And let Prfr abbreviate the phrase (5) “there is a
r-metaselection fr” if the rth rank of the conclusion is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the conclusion), we have P1f1 . . .Pnfn such that the conclusion
Φ
{
(A∧ki B)∨lj C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). By lemma 3.1, the conclusion Φ
{
(A∧ki B)∨lj C
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)) iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and Φ{A∨lj C} (resp. Φ{B∨lj C})
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). This, in turn, is the case iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and
Φ{A ∨mj C1} (resp. Φ{B ∨nj C2}) is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗, (g1, . . . , gn)).
5 The above, in turn, is the
case iff the premise Φ
{
(A ∨mj C1) ∧ki (B ∨nj C2)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). Finally, we have
Q1g1 . . .Qngn such that the premise is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). Hence, the premise is true
under ∗.
Case (b): cluster l is a non-singleton in the conclusion (which means m = n = l). By employing an
essentially similar (but simpler) argument as we did in Case (a), this case can be easily proven, so we
leave details to the reader.
Rule III: We want to show that the premise Φ
{
(A ◦mj C) ⊙ki (B ◦nj D)
}
is true under ∗ iff so is
the conclusion Φ
{
(A ⊙ki B) ◦lj (C ⊙ki D)
}
, where conditions (i),(ii) are satisfied as described in the
preceding introduction of this rule. Suppose that both the premise and the conclusion have (the same)
n ranks 1, . . . , n. Again, we only consider one situation that both ⊙ and ◦ are ∨ and i < j, with the
other situations being similar. Two (sub)cases are further considered below.
Case (a): cluster l is a singleton in the conclusion (which means clusters m,n are singletons in the
premise).
Suppose that the premise Φ
{
(A ∨mj C) ∨ki (B ∨nj D)
}
is true under ∗. For any r ∈ {1, . . . , n},
let Qrfr abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every r-metaselection fr” if the rth rank of the conclusion is
conjunctive, and the phrase (2) “let fr be the r-metaselection gr, where gr is the one in phrase (5)” if
the rth rank of the conclusion is disjunctive and r ≤ i, and the phrase (3) “let fr be a r-metaselection
satisfying the condition that fr(l) = gr(m) when gi(k) = left, fr(l) = gr(n) when gi(k) = right, and fr
agrees with gr on all other clusters, where gr is the r-metaselection in phrase (5)” if the rth rank of the
conclusion is disjunctive and r > i. Let Prgr abbreviate the phrase (4) “for the r-metaselection gr = fr,
where fr comes from phrase (1)” if the rth rank of the premise is conjunctive, and the phrase (5) “there
is a r-metaselection gr” if the rth rank of the premise is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the premise), we have that P1g1 . . .Pngn such that the premise
Φ
{
(A ∨mj C) ∨ki (B ∨nj D)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). By lemma 3.1, the premise Φ
{
(A ∨mj
C)∨ki (B∨njD)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)) iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and Φ
{
A∨mj C
}
(resp. Φ
{
B ∨nj D
}
) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). This, in turn, is the case iff fi(k) = left (resp.
fi(k) = right) and Φ
{
A ∨lj C
}
(resp. Φ
{
B ∨lj D
}
) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Further, by
the condition that t ≥ i.
5The same to the preceding note.
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lemma 3.1 (applied twice), the above is the case iff the conclusion Φ
{
(A∨ki B)∨lj (C∨kiD)
}
is metatrue
w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Finally, we have that Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such that the conclusion is metatrue w.r.t.
(∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Hence the conclusion is true under
∗.
Now suppose that the conclusion Φ
{
(A∨ki B)∨lj (C ∨ki D)
}
is true under ∗. For any r ∈ {1, . . . , n},
let Qrgr abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every r-metaselection gr” if the rth rank of the premise is
conjunctive, and the phrase (2) “let gr be the r-metaselection fr, where fr is the one in phrase (5)” if
the rth rank of the premise is disjunctive and r ≤ i, and the phrase (3) “let gr be a r-metaselection
satisfying the condition that gr(m) = gr(n) = fr(l) and gr agrees with fr on all other clusters, where
fr is the r-metaselection in phrase (5)” if the rth rank of the premise is disjunctive and r > i. Let Prfr
abbreviate the phrase (4) “for the r-metaselection fr = gr, where gr comes from phrase (1)” if the rth
rank of the conclusion is conjunctive, and the phrase (5) “there is a r-metaselection fr” if the rth rank
of the conclusion is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the conclusion), we have P1f1 . . .Pnfn such that the conclusion
Φ
{
(A ∨ki B) ∨lj (C ∨ki D)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). By lemma 3.1 (applied twice), the
conclusion Φ
{
(A ∨ki B) ∨lj (C ∨ki D)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)) iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) =
right) and Φ
{
A ∨lj C
}
(resp. Φ
{
B ∨lj D
}
) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). This, in turn, is the
case iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and Φ
{
A ∨mj C
}
(resp. Φ
{
B ∨nj D
}
) is metatrue w.r.t.
(∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). The above, in turn, is the case iff the premise Φ
{
(A∨mj C)∨ki (B ∨nj D)
}
is metatrue
w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). Hence we have Q1g1 . . .Qngn such that the premise Φ
{
(A∨mj C)∨ki (B∨nj D)
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)), and hence the premise is true under
∗.
Case (b): cluster l is a non-singleton in the conclusion. This case can be proven in a similar (but
simpler) way as we did in Case (a), whose verification is left to the reader.
Rule IV: We want to show that, when i < j, the premise Φ
{
A[lj]⊙ki B[l
j/rj ]
}
is true under ∗ iff so
is the conclusion Φ
{
A[lj]⊙ki B[l
j]
}
, where conditions (i),(ii) are satisfied as described in the preceding
introduction of this rule. Here we only consider the case when rank i is conjunctive and rank j is
disjunctive, with the other cases being similar. Obviously, the premise and the conclusion has the same
(number of) ranks. Suppose that both of them have n ranks 1, . . . , n.
Suppose that the premise Φ
{
A[lj ] ∧ki B[l
j/rj ]
}
is true under ∗. For any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Qtft
abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every t-metaselection ft” if the tth rank of the conclusion is conjunctive,
and the phrase (2) “let ft be the t-metaselection gt, where gt is the one in phrase (5)” if the tth rank
of the conclusion is disjunctive and t 6= j, and the phrase (3) “let ft be the t-metaselection satisfying
the condition that ft(l) = gt(l) when fi(k) = left, ft(l) = gt(r) when fi(k) = right and ft agrees with
gt on all other clusters, where gt is the t-metaselection in phrase (5)” if the tth rank of the conclusion
is disjunctive and t = j. Let Ptgt abbreviate the phrase (4) “for the t-metaselection gt = ft where
ft comes from phrase (1)” if the tth rank of the premise is conjunctive, and the phrase (5) “there is a
t-metaselection gt” if the tth rank of the premise is disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the premise), we have P1g1 . . .Pngn such that the premise
Φ
{
A[lj ]∧kiB[l
j/rj ]
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). By lemma 3.1, the premise Φ
{
A[lj]∧kiB[l
j/rj ]
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)) iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and Φ
{
A[lj ]
}
(resp. Φ
{
B[lj/rj ]
}
)
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). This, in turn, is the case iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and
Φ
{
A[lj ]
}
(resp. Φ
{
B[lj]
}
) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)).
6 The above, in turn, is the case iff the
conclusion Φ
{
A[lj ] ∧ki B[l
j]
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Finally, we have Q1f1 . . .Qnfn such
that the conclusion is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). Hence, the conclusion is true under
∗.
Now suppose that the conclusion Φ
{
A[lj ]∧ki B[l
j]
}
is true under ∗. For any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Qtgt
abbreviate the phrase (1) “for every t-metaselection gt” if the tth rank of the premise is conjunctive,
and the phrase (2) “let gt be the t-metaselection ft, where ft is the one in phrase (5)” if the tth rank
of the premise is disjunctive and t 6= j, and the phrase (3) “let gt be the t-metaselection satisfying the
6Note that l only occurs in the subcirquents A and B in the conclusion, and that i < j.
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condition that gt(r) = ft(l) and gt agrees with ft on all other clusters, where ft is the t-metaselection
in phrase (5)” if the tth rank of the premise is disjunctive and t = j. Let Ptft abbreviate the phrase
(4) “for the t-metaselection ft = gt where gt comes from phrase (1)” if the tth rank of the conclusion
is conjunctive, and the phrase (5) “there is a t-metaselection ft” if the tth rank of the conclusion is
disjunctive.
Then, by the definition of truth (of the conclusion), we have P1f1 . . .Pnfn such that the conclusion
Φ
{
A[lj ]∧kiB[l
j]
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). But by lemma 3.1, the conclusion Φ
{
A[lj]∧kiB[l
j]
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)) iff fi(k) = left (resp. fi(k) = right) and Φ
{
A[lj ]
}
(resp. Φ
{
B[lj]
}
)
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (f1, . . . , fn)). This, in turn, is the case iff gi(k) = left (resp. gi(k) = right) and
Φ
{
A[lj ]
}
(resp. Φ
{
B[lj/rj ]
}
) is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)).
7 The above, in turn, is the case iff the
premise Φ
{
A[lj ] ∧ki B[l
j/rj ]
}
is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)). Hence we have Q1g1 . . .Qngn such
that the premise is metatrue w.r.t. (∗, (g1, . . . , gn)), and hence the premise is true under
∗.
3.2 The soundness and completeness of RIFp
Theorem 3.3 A cirquent is valid if and only if it is provable in RIFp.
Proof. The soundness part is immediate, because the axioms are obviously valid and, by Lemma 3.2,
all rules preserve truth and hence validity. For the completeness part, consider an arbitrary cirquent C
and assume it is valid. We want to show that C is provable in RIFp.
In the context of a given cirquent D, we define the level of an oconnective a, denoted by LD(a), to
be the total number of oconnectives b such that a is in the scope of b. An oconnective b is a child of
an oconnective a and a is the parent of b when b is in the scope of a and LD(b) = LD(a) + 1. The
relations “descendant” and “ancestor” are the transitive closures of the relations “child” and “parent”,
respectively. The distance between an oconnective a and one of its descendants b is defined to be the
positive integer k such that k = LD(b) − LD(a); when the distance between a and b is less than the
distance between a and another descendant c of a, we say that b is nearer to a (or vice versa) than c
is. Next, for any two oconnectives a and b, we denote their nearest common ancestor oconnective by
ab.
If our cirquent C is classical (i.e. every cluster of it is a singleton), then the validity of C can be seen
to mean nothing but its validity in the sense of classical logic. So, in this case, C is an axiom of RIFp
and hence is provable.
Now, for the rest of this proof, assume that C is not classical and that it has n ranks 1, . . . , n. We
construct, bottom-up, a proof of C as follows. We will use D to denote the current (topmost in the
so far constructed proof) cirquent and, for convenience of descriptions, when an oconnective a is in
(whatever) cluster k which is of rank i, we also say that a is in rank i.
Step 1: Let i be a variable during this step to denote the number of iterations of the outmost loop
of Step 1. For i = 1 to n, do the following: repeat the step below while there is an oconnective c in D
such that c is in rank i and that an ancestor of c is in rank j while j > i:
• Let S be a collection of all oconnectives b in D satisfying the condition that b is in rank i and that
an ancestor of b is in rank j with j > i. Pick an oconnective a in S such that LD(a) ≤ LD(b) for
any b in S. Repeat the following two steps while the parent of a is in rank j with j > i:
– Apply (bottom-up) Rule II to D, with a being the key oconnective of this application (in the
conclusion);
7The same to the preceding note.
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– Rename the key oconnective of this application (in the premise) into a.
With some thoughts, one can see that Rule II can always be applied to the current cirquent while
“the parent of a is in rank j with j > i”. Note that every time Rule II is (bottom-up) applied, the level
of the picked oconnective a in the current cirquent is decreased by 1. Below we show that, for any fixed
i, the ith loop of Step 1 terminates in finite steps.
For the current cirquent D at any given stage of the ith loop of Step 1 — hencefore we shall use
D as (also) a name of that stage — we define the i-distribution of D to be an infinite sequence
(x0, x1, x2, . . .) where, for any m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, xm is the total number of oconnectives c such that c is
in rank i and that LD(c) = m.
Further, we define the relation “≤” on the set of all such sequences as follows. For any two sequences
(x0, x1, x2, . . .) and (y0, y1, y2, . . .), (x0, x1, x2, . . .) ≤ (y0, y1, y2, . . .) if and only if one of the following
conditions holds: for any m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, xm = ym; x0 > y0; x0 = y0 and x1 > y1; x0 = y0, x1 = y1
and x2 > y2; x0 = y0, x1 = y1, x2 = y2 and x3 > y3; . . .. It is easy to see that “≤” well-orders the set
of all i-distributions, with each sequence (i-distribution) denoting an ordinal < ωω.
Then, we can see that the i-distribution of the current cirquent keeps strictly decreasing during
the ith loop of Step 1, meaning that the latter terminates at some point. Hence, the above Step 1
terminates and we get a cirquent C1 where there is no oconnecitves c such that c is in rank i and an
ancestor of c is in rank j with j > i. We call this property that C1 have the property 1 for later
reference. Since Rule II preserves truth in the bottom-up direction (by Lemma 3.2) and C is valid, C1
is valid. Then, our construction of a proof of C continues upward from C1 as follows.
Step 2: Repeat applying (bottom-up) Rule I to D until no longer possible.
Every time Rule I is applied, the current cirquent loses one pair of oconnectives a, b such that a, b
are in the same cluster and b is a descendant of a (or vice versa). So, sooner or later, we get a cirquent
C2 where no descendant-ancestor pair of oconnectives shares the same cluster. We call this property
that C2 have the property 2 for later reference. Obviously, C2 also have the property 1. Since Rule I
preserves truth in the bottom-up direction (Lemma 3.2), C2 is valid. Next, our construction continues
as follows.
Step 3: Let i be a variable during this step to denote the number of iterations of the outmost loop
of Step 3. For i = 1 to n, do the following:
• 3.1 Repeat the step below while there are non-singleton clusters of rank i in D.
– Pick any cluster k from the collection of all non-singleton clusters of rank i in D. Repeat the
following four steps until cluster k becomes a singleton cluster in D.
∗ 3.1.1 Pick any pair a, b of oconnectives such that the following two conditions are sat-
isfied: a, b are both in cluster k; LD(ab) ≥ LD(cd) for any pair of oconnectives c, d in
cluster k. Set m = 2 and l = LD(ab).8
∗ 3.1.2 Repeatedly perform the following two actions until LD(a) = l + 1: (i) Apply
(bottom-up) Rule II to D, with a being the key oconnective of this application (in the
conclusion); (ii) Rename the key oconnective of this application (in the premise) into a.
∗ 3.1.3 Repeatedly perform the following two actions until LD(b) = l + 1: (i) Apply
(bottom-up) Rule II to D, with b being the key oconnective of this application (in the
conclusion); (ii) Rename the key oconnective of this application (in the premise) into b.
∗ 3.1.4 Apply (bottom-up) Rule III to D, with a, b being the key oconnectives of this
application (in the conclusion). Set m = 1.
8Here m is a variable that records the number of elements of the collection of key oconnectives in the current cirquent.
It is introduced into the process mainly for later difinitions and proofs.
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• 3.2 Label all the oconnectives in rank i of D with “unused” and repeat the following step until
there is no oconnectives in D labeled with “unused”:
– Pick an unused oconnective c in rank i of D such that LD(c) ≤ LD(d) for any unused
oconnective d in rank i of D. Repeat the following until no longer possible and label c with
“used”:
∗ Apply (bottom-up) Rule IV to D, with c being the key oconnective of this application
(in the conclusion);
∗ Rename the key oconnective of this application (in the premise) into c.
During the above Step 3, property 1 always holds for the current cirquent D. Below are the reasons.
At the beginning of Step 3, property 1 holds for D. Then, with some thought, one can see that in step
3.1.1 the oconnective ab for the picked a, b is also in rank i (otherwise, say, if ab is in rank j with j < i,
then Rule IV can be applied (bottom-up) to the current cirquent with ab being the key oconnective in
the conclusion, which contradicts what the preceding (sub)steps 3.2 have done). So, each oconnective
c, which is both an ancestor of a (resp. b) and a descendant of ab, is also in rank i. Thus, applying
Rule II to D as described in step 3.1.2 (resp. 3.1.3) will not destroy its property 1. For the same reason,
applying Rule III to D in step 3.1.4 will neither destroy its property 1. Finally, applying Rule IV to
D in step 3.2 obviously will not destroy its property 1, either. This property ensures that, in the ith
iteration of the outmost loop of Step 3 when Rule II is applied to the current cirquent in step 3.1.2
(resp. 3.1.3), a (resp. b) and its parent e are in the same rank i and all the descendent of e are in
ranks j with j ≥ i. And hence Rule II can always be applied in step 3.1.2 (resp. 3.1.3). Similarly, this
property also ensues that a and b are in the same rank as ab is at the beginning of step 3.1.4, and hence
Rule III can always be applied in this step.
During the above Step 3, property 2 also holds for the current cirquent D. To see why, note that
there are no descendant-ancestor pairs within any given cluster in D at the beginning of Step 3. If so,
picking any pair a, b of oconnectives in step 3.1.1 will not give rise to the situation. Next, applying
Rule II to D in step 3.1.2 (resp. 3.1.3) means that LD(a) (resp. LD(b)) is greater than LD(ab) + 1;
fourthly, during steps 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, l’s being maximal ensures that, when applying Rule II
as its introductory figure shows to the current cirquent D, the subcirquent C does not contain any
oconnective e that is also in cluster k (otherwise, LD(ae) > LD(ab) (resp. LD(be) > LD(ab)), which
contradicts the conditions satisfied by a, b). Finally, based on the above conditions, applying Rule III
in step 3.1.4 and applying Rule IV in step 3.2 will not create any descendant-ancestor pairs within any
given cluster, either. This property ensures that, when the current cirquent has non-singleton clusters
k of any rank i during Step 3, the relation between any two different oconnectives in cluster k will not
be a descendant-ancestor pair.
Now we verify that Step 3 terminates in a finite number of steps, as shown in the following (i)—(iii).
(i) Firstly, we claim that, for the picked cluster k from the collection of all non-singleton clusters of
rank i in the current cirquent D, the four-step procedure (i.e. steps 3.1.1—3.1.4) terminates in a finite
number of steps. To see why, we give the following definition.
For the current cirquent D at any given stage of the four-step procedure, we define the state of D
to be the four-tuple (x, y, z, t) as follows, where mD, aD, bD are the values of the corresponding three
variables of the procedure at the beginning of stage D:
• x is the number of elements in cluster k of rank i of D;
• y = x−mD;
• z = LD(aD) + L
D(bD) if mD = 2, and z = L
D(aD)− 1 if mD = 1;
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• t is the total number of elements in all other non-singleton clusters of rank i of D except cluster
k.
Further, we define the relation “≤” on the set of all such tuples as follows. For any two tuples
(x1, y1, z1, t1) and (x2, y2, z2, t2), (x1, y1, z1, t1) ≤ (x2, y2, z2, t2) if and only if one of the following con-
ditions holds: (i) x1 < x2; (ii) x1 = x2 and y1 < y2; (iii) x1 = x2, y1 = y2 and z1 < z2; (iv) x1 = x2,
y1 = y2, z1 = z2 and t1 < t2; (v) x1 = x2, y1 = y2, z1 = z2 and t1 = t2. It is easy to see that “≤”
well-orders the set of all states, with each tuple (state) denoting an ordinal < ω4.
Now we show that every step of the four-step procedure strictly decreases the state of the current
cirquent. One can see that the state of the current cirquent depends on cluster k of rank i and the
picked pair of a, b. At the beginning of this procedure, for the picked cluster k and the picked pair of a, b
in step 3.1.1, the state (x, y, z, t) has its original value. In step 3.1.2 (resp. 3.1.3), every time substeps
(i),(ii) are performed for a (resp. b), x, y do not change, but z decreases by 1; then in step 3.1.4, when
Rule III is applied, x is decreased by 1. As long as cluster k of rank i is not a singleton, the process
will come into the next iteration of the loop. During each iteration, a new pair of a, b is picked and the
value of m is changed from 1 to 2 in step 3.1.1, which makes x unchanged but y is decreased by 1; then
every iteration of the inner loop in step 3.1.2 leaves x, y unchanged but decreases z by 1; and then step
3.1.4 decreases x by 1. Thus, the state keeps decreasing during the procedure, meaning that the latter
terminates at some point.
(ii) Secondly, we show that, for the fixed i, step 3.1 ends up in finite steps. Suppose that, at the
beginning of step 3.1 in the ith iteration of the outmost loop of Step 3, the number of non-singleton
clusters of rank i in the current cirquent D is m. Then, after the four-step procedure terminates for
the first time, we get the resulting cirquent D1 where the number of non-singleton clusters of rank i
is m− 1, since no new non-singleton clusters of rank i are created during the four-step procedure and
cluster k became a singleton. Pick any cluster k′ from the collection of all non-singleton clusters of
rank i in D1 and carry out the same steps as we did with D, then we get the resulting cirquent D2,
with m− 2 non-singleton clusters of rank i. Every time the above steps are performed, the number of
non-singleton clusters of rank i in the current (topmost) cirquent decreases by 1. Therefore, sooner or
later, we get the resulting cirquent Dm having no non-singleton clusters of rank i.
(iii) Finally, it’s not hard to see that, for the fixed i, step 3.2 terminates in finite steps. Hence, the
overall Step 3 will end up in finite steps.
Thus, our construction of a proof of C continues upward from C2 to the resulting cirquent C3 after
applying Step 3. Since only Rule II, Rule III and Rule IV are applied during Step 3 when we get C3 from
C2 and all of these rules preserve truth in the bottom-up direction, C3 is valid. Further, we see that all
the clusters of each rank of C3 are singletons (because, during Step 3, once all the clusters of any rank
i of the current cirquent become singletons, the later steps will not change them into non-singletons).
Therefore, C3 is classical. Hence, our construction of a proof of C ends up with the top most cirquent
C3, which is an axiom of RIFp.
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